Abstract-Wormhole attacks in ad-hoc networks have been attracting much attention over the years. They consist in two malicious nodes tunneling traffic from one end of the network to the other. Several approaches are proposed to detect these attacks but only few solutions exploit the information provided by multipath routing schemes. A new approach detecting wormhole attacks is presented in this paper. The Witness Integration Multipath protocol is based on the multipath DSR routing protocol and finds suspicious behaviour related to wormhole attacks. It does not require any major protocol modification nor as much cryptographic processing as the previous solutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile ad-hoc networks have been an attractive field of research for many years now. Due to their characteristics, these networks are an excellent choice for emergency operations, vehicular communication and short-live networks.
Ad-hoc networks must deal with threats from external agents and compromised internal nodes. The lack of a central control and the fact that each node must forward packets of other nodes represent major security challenges. In such environments, it is difficult to assure the confidentiality and the integrity of the communications as well as the availability of the services.
In this paper, we focus on the wormhole attacks. In these attacks, two malicious nodes tunnel traffic from one end of the network to the other end using an out-band link. Their main goal is to attract traffic to drop, alter or, simply, look at the packets later on.
Due to the characteristics of the wormhole attacks, cryptographic solutions are not sufficient. Numerous physical approaches have been proposed to secure the neighbour discovery process. Most of the solutions presented so far require that the nodes handle information about self-location, perform clocks synchronization or rely on specialized antennas or on information such as trust relationship. Only few solutions have been proposed to secure the overall end-to-end route discovery process.
In this paper, we propose a new approach based on a multipath source routing protocol to prevent and detect potential Layer-3 wormhole attacks. The Witness Integration Multipath DSR (WIM-DSR) solution relies on the information provided by the routing protocol to determine if there are some typical inconsistencies associated usually to wormhole attacks. This solution does not require any cryptographic processing by the intermediate nodes if no incoherency has been discovered (i.e. no attack takes place). This point represents the main advantages over the previous solutions. [1] In a wormhole attack, an adversary tunnels traffic from one end of a network to the other end. It is done usually by two malicious nodes strategically located. In Fig. 1 , the malicious nodes M 1 and M 2 perform a wormhole attack tunnelling the traffic sent by the source S to the destination D. According to Wang et al. [1] , there are three types of wormholes. In closed wormholes, the neighbour discovery beacons are tunnelled between M 1 and M 2 without adding any self information. Thus, S and D believe that they are neighbours. The malicious nodes are external agents such as simple transceivers that can stay invisible for S and D. This attack targets the neighbour discovery process. In open wormholes, both malicious nodes are compromised internal nodes participating to the routing protocol. Finally, in half-open wormholes, only one malicious node is a compromised node. The other node is simply an external agent. In such a case, the beacons of the compromised node M 1 are tunnelled towards the external malicious node M 2 and the beacons of the M 2 neighbours are tunnelled back towards M 1 . 978-1-4244-4661-2/09/$25.00 ©2009 IEEEAnother characterisation of the wormhole attacks is proposed by Buttýan and Hubaux [2] . The term wormhole attack is used for a Layer-2 attack where the malicious agents are invisible transceivers exchanging messages from one end of the network to the other end (closed wormholes). The term tunnelling attack is proposed for a Layer-3 attack where the compromised internal nodes interact actively with the routing protocol (open wormholes).
II. WORMHOLE ATTACKS AND THEIR GOALS
The malicious nodes can use either a physical out-of-band link (wired or wireless) or a logical encapsulated tunnel in the network itself. However, the first alternative is more realistic since it is more efficient and flexible. This is particularly important for the wormhole attacks targeting the neighbour discovery process.
The goal of the malicious nodes is to improve the likelihood of being involved in the shortest path linking two nodes, visibly or not. They should have access to traffic that could be out of reach otherwise. Once the malicious nodes have accessed to the traffic, they can perform black hole attacks (dropping all the packets), grey hole attacks (dropping only some packets), or simply eavesdrop on the traffic searching for vital information. In the former case, the tunnel connects a malicious node at d-hop from the source to one at (d+1)-hop (see Fig. 2a ). In the latter case, the second malicious node is at least at (d + 2)-hop from the source (see Fig. 2b) . If weak open wormholes do not give necessarily shorter paths to the destinations, strong open wormholes do. They represent a real threat and should always be chosen by any routing protocol selecting the shortest paths.
III. RELATED WORKS
Several approaches have been developed to prevent or to detect wormhole attacks. The main solutions are reviewed briefly in this section. The first three solutions address mainly the closed wormhole attacks. They present how to protect the neighbour discovery process.
Hu et al. [3] propose the addition of leashes containing timing and/or position information to packets. A leash restricts the maximum transmission distance permitted to a packet. They propose two kinds of leashes: geographical and temporal. To use geographical leashes, each node must know its own location (e.g. GPS) and all nodes must have loosely synchronized clocks. To use temporal leashes, all nodes must have tightly synchronized clocks. Thus, if a receiving node determines that the neighbour discovery beacon of a given node has travelled too far, the node should discard it.
Capkun et al. [4] estimate the distance separating two nodes from the round-trip travel time taken by a message and its acknowledgement. This mechanism relies on a specialized hardware allowing the destination to send a response to a onebit challenge message as fast as possible.
Hu and Evans [5] use directional antennas to detect wormhole attacks. If a node uses a specific sector to communicate with a neighbour, this neighbour should use its opposite sector. The existence of a wormhole would introduce inconsistencies in the network that could be detected by the other nodes simply by adding some sector information to the packets.
The next solutions address the open wormhole attacks. They present how to prevent or detect malicious actions from compromised internal agents. Pirzada and McDonald [6] derive a trust relationship for neighbour nodes based upon their compliance to a routing protocol (DSR). The nodes' trust levels are then used to avoid communication through potential wormholes.
Khalil et al. [7] propose that the nodes in a static network obtain in a secure way the one-hop and two-hops topological information from their neighbours. Then, each node observes the behaviour of their neighbours searching for typical patterns related to wormhole attacks. The same authors also propose to support nodes mobility by adding a trusted central authority in charge of authorizing nodes to move and to create new neighbour associations [8] .
Wang et al. [1] extend the geographical leashes and use them in an end-to-end verification process. This process determines whether all the supposedly neighbour pairs of a path are not too far apart.
Finally, Qian et al. [9] present a different approach to detect wormhole attacks. The solution is based on statistical analysis of the information gathered during the multipath routing process (SMR). A link generating a wormhole attack should be used by the routing protocol with an unusually high frequency. Unfortunately, only uniform grid networks have been considered.
IV. WIM-DSR

A. Multi-path Routing
The Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol [10] is an ondemand source routing protocol for mobile ad-hoc networks. When a source needs a path towards a destination, it broadcasts Route Request (RREQ) messages. As these messages are forwarded, they gather the intermediate nodes they go through. Then, the destination replies with unicast Route Reply (RREP) messages to the source. The source chooses its path based on the received RREP messages. To avoid too many RREQ packets in the network, the protocol uses two mechanisms: local cache and selective broadcasting for intermediate nodes.
An intermediate node can respond if it has a valid path in its cache. Otherwise, it forwards the request message if it is a new one.
The DSR protocol has been adapted to discover disjoint multipaths between a source and a destination. Using multiple paths can improve the quality of service as well as the fault resilience of a network.
The routing protocol used in this paper is based on a modification of the Split Multipath Routing (SMR) protocol [11] proposed by Quian et al. [9] . The modified protocol allows intermediate nodes to forward repeated copies of a RREQ message, as long as their hop counts are not larger than the hop counts of already received copies. The destination should receive numerous copies of the RREQ message. Thus, the destination should be able to build a list of available paths from the source; this information gives a partial view of the network that would be used by the WIM-DSR protocol in the discovery of possible wormhole attacks.
The WIM-DSR final step is slightly different from the previous protocols. The destination chooses a path and broadcasts it towards the source. The intermediate nodes should rebroadcast only one copy of a given RREQ message. This step should allow intermediate nodes to validate the information.
B. Assumptions and Threat Model
The main objective of WIM-DSR is to gather information during the route discovery phase and to find possible anomalies due to open wormhole attacks. To limit these attacks, the following assumptions are made:
Assumption I: The number of malicious nodes participating in a wormhole attack is restricted to two nodes. Assumption II: Each legitimate node can carry out securely its neighbour discovery process by using temporal leashes [3] . Assumption III: Each legitimate node has a unique cryptographic identity which can be used to authenticate control messages. All legitimate nodes can verify these authentication tags. Assumption IV: The cryptographic identity is implemented in a secure tamperproof token (e.g. a smart card).
The second assumption has two important benefits: the nodes know the identity of their neighbours and a malicious node cannot use another remote malicious node as an oracle -limiting the chance to perform Sybil attacks [12] .
Finally, the last two assumptions limit the capacity of a compromised node to impersonate another compromised node by using multiple wireless interfaces and multiple cryptographic identities locally -limiting again the chance to perform Sybil attacks successfully. These assumptions are rarely stated explicitly but numerous papers rely on them (e.g. [7] and [1] ).
C. Edge Witnesses
WIM-DSR determines if the information gathered by the modified routing protocol during the route discovery shows the typical behaviour of wormhole attacks.
Let us introduce some notations. Let G(r) = (N, E(r)) denote the geometric graph defined by the set of nodes N and the transmission range of the nodes r. In this graph, two nodes are connected if and only if their distance is less than or equal to r. This graph represents the underlying topology of the network. Finally, let L G (X , d) define the set of nodes in G at d hops of the node X . This can be obtained by a breadth-first search from X .
An open wormhole attack between two malicious compromised nodes should simply add an edge between the two nodes in G(r). This should shorten the distance between some pairs of nodes.
During the route discovery, the destination receives multiple copies of a RREQ message. Each copy represents a distinct path between the source and the destination. Thus, the destination can reconstruct a subset of G(r). This subset is denoted G RREQ (r).
WIM-DSR presented in the next section relies on the following concept of edge witnesses: Definition 4.1: Let e = {v i , v j } be an edge of a path from S to D in G RREQ (r). A node v w is a weak forward witness for e iff i. 
The second definition gives a stronger witness and should be preferred. It simply states that there is two distinct paths joining two nodes in the network. Since there are only two malicious nodes (Assumption I), these strongly witnessed nodes cannot forma wormhole.
Intuitively, an edge witness gives more evidence that two nodes are really neighbours and are not part of a wormhole. For example, in Fig. 2b, M 1 is the only node at one-hop from S claiming to be adjacent to M 2 . Hence, no forward witness can be found for the edge {M 1 , M 2 }.
The aim of WIM-DSR is to find fully witnessed paths, i.e. paths with only witnessed edges between the source and the destination. The algorithm constructs the fully forward witnessed path inductively. Assuming that the source S is not compromised, it proceeds forward hop by hop constructing the sets of nodes L GRREQ (S, i), for i > 0. Unfortunately, such a forward path does not always exist. In such a case, assuming that the destination D is not compromised, the algorithm proceeds backward hop by hop. Definitions 1 and 2 have to be adapted accordingly to define backward witnesses.
Fully witnessed path should not contain any open wormhole. Strongly witnessed paths should be preferred. However, weakly witnessed paths should also be considered since the strongly witnessed condition is very restrictive and can generate numerous false positive alarms. 
D. WIM-DSR route discovery
When a source S wants to discover a route to a destination D, it broadcasts a RREQ message. Each intermediate node rebroadcasts these messages, as long as their hop counts are not larger than the hop counts of already received messages. In this process, the nodes add their identification to the messages. Thus, several messages should arrive to D.
With all the different RREQ messages received, D is able to build a partial representation of the network topology G RREQ (r). The next step is to find if there is a fully forward witnessed
The first alternative is presented in Algorithm 1 and finds strong forward witnessed paths. The second alternative is presented in Algorithm 2 and finds weak forward witnessed paths. Both algorithms can be adapted easily to determine whether fully backward witnessed paths exist or not.
Input : The paths P = {p 1 , p 2 , . .., p t } obtained from the RREQ messages. Output: A strongly forward witnessed path p from S to D in G RREQ (r).
Compute the graph G RREQ (r) from the paths in P .
1
Compute the set of neighbours
Find if there is a path 
Using a breadth-first search, compute
Using a breadth-first search, find if there is a path p 5 between S and D in G RREQ (r) s.t. the value n ij of every internal node v ij is greater that 1. Return the shortest path p with its weak forward 6 witnesses, if one exits.
Algorithm 2: Weakly forward witnessed path selection
Once a fully witnessed path is found, the destination signs its RREP message and broadcasts it towards the source. For a strong witnessed path, the destination broadcasts a unique signed RREP message which is rebroadcast by all the nodes of the path. The other nodes simply overhear it. This allows each witness to receive the message from at least two nodes. For a path of length l, only l − 1 RREP messages are sent overall.
For a weak witnessed path, the destination unicasts a signed RREP message along the path. Moreover, for each witness, the destination also unicasts a signed confirmation RREP message along a path going through that witness. For a path of length l, l − 1 messages are sent by the nodes in L GRREQ (S, i),
2 messages are sent in total. 
Strongly witnessed paths should be preferred. The answering process is more efficient. Moreover, these paths give some alternatives. The subchain (v i−1 , w i , v i+1 ) witnessed by the v i can replace the subchain (v i−1 , v i , v i+1 ) witnessed by the node w i .
E. Analysis
The path selection algorithms cannot discover a weak open wormhole attack. In Fig. 2a , M 1 and M 2 have established a wormhole between them. The algorithms should find two strong forward (v 1 and v 2 ), two strong backward (v 3 and v 4 ), two weak forward (v 1 and v 2 ) and two weak backward (v 3 and v 4 ) witnesses for this wormhole. This represents a false-negative detection for WIM-DSR. However, this does not increase the security risk significantly. Even without this tunnel, M 1 and M 2 would have belonged to four of the seven discovered shortest paths (see Table 1 ). Thus, the weak open wormhole just adds one shortest path between the source and the destination.
The real gain for the malicious nodes is the strong open wormhole attack (see Fig. 2b ). In such a case, they would be selected by any protocol selecting the shortest paths. Such a wormhole represents a shortcut in the network.
The effectiveness of WIM-DSR to detect open wormhole attacks is proven in the following lemmas. They show that the path selection algorithms cannot find false witnesses for strong open wormholes. First suppose that y receives the RREP message from M 1 (see Fig. 4a ). If w is a legitimate neighbour of y, y accepts the message and rebroadcasts it. Then, w verifies the signature of the message, rejects it and broadcasts a signed warning message. It is important here that M 1 cannot impersonate M 2 for w during the neighbour discovery process (Assumptions II to IV). If w is not a legitimate neighbour of y, y verifies the signature of the message, rejects it and broadcasts a warning message. Now suppose that M 1 impersonates y and unicasts the RREP message directly to x. When x rebroadcasts the message, y detects an anomaly, verifies the signature of the message and broadcasts a signed warning message. This applies also if M 1 impersonates any node in the path between S and M 1 . Thus, any fake witness can be fought back from a legitimate node. Fig. 4b ). By definition, there is no weak forward witness connecting y and M 2 . Thus, M 1 with the help of M 2 would have to forge a fake RREQ message including the partial path (· · · , y, w, M 2 ) to force Algorithm 2 to find the fake witness w.
First suppose that w receives the confirmation RREP message from M 2 through M 1 (see Fig. 4b ). Then, w verifies the signature of the message, rejects it and broadcasts a signed warning message. It is crucial that M 1 cannot impersonate M 2 for w during the neighbour discovery process (Assumptions II to IV). Now suppose that M 1 tries to impersonate w and unicasts the confirmation RREP message directly to y. This can be discarded by asking to y to unicast an acknowledgement to w. Thus, any fake witness can be fought back from a legitimate node.
For efficiency, an intermediate node validates the signature of a message only if it claims falsely that the node is connected to another node, showing an inconsistency, or if it is a warning message. Thus, if there is no attack, the intermediate nodes do not have to do any cryptographic processing. This is an important improvement on the solution proposed by Wang et al. [1] .
Finally, the malicious nodes M 1 and M 2 can cause denials of service by altering the information provided during the source routing protocol. They can add or remove nodes in the messages. This can be prevented by secure source routing protocols [13] . However, these protocols are quite demanding and do not prevent strong open wormhole attacks.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
The last point to verify is if the WIM-DSR protocol would detect numerous false attacks. A program simulating 100 static nodes randomly distributed in a 1000m × 1000m square has been developed. Each simulation analyzes the paths connecting all the possible pairs of source and destination nodes in the set. Each experiment presented here corresponds to the average of 1000 simulations on independent sets. The objective is to determine how many pairs of source and destination nodes do not have fully witnessed paths in a given set of points. These pairs would represent the false positive alarms for the protocol.
The network density is important for ad-hoc networks. For a given region, there are two ways to increase the density: (1) increase the number of nodes or (2) increase the transmission range of the nodes. Since the complexity of the simulation program depends on the number of nodes, the number of nodes is fixed and different range values are used.
It is essential to find a lower bound on the transmission range to assure that G(r) would be connected or, at least, would have a large connected component containing most of its nodes. The properties of such graphs on a unit torus have been studied extensively. It has been proven that such a graph with n nodes is connected with a high probability if the transmission range is at least ln n+O (1) πn [14] . Such a bound has been observed during the simulations in the plane. Only 128, 44 and 17 cases out of 1000 simulations were not connected for 190m, 210m and 230m, respectively. It seems that the bound is greater in the plane since the border nodes are not connected to the opposite border nodes contrary to the torus case. Thus, 210m seems the minimal lower bound on the transmission range to consider.
We are now ready to present the results of our simulations. It should be noted that a non-negligible number of pairs of nodes at distance 2 do not have any strong witness. Since the source and the destination are not malicious, no Layer-3 wormhole is possible in such a case. Thus, these case can be dismissed.
Therefore, for an appropriate network density (210m or 230m), only few pair of nodes (false positive alarms) cannot find fully witnessed paths. In such cases, they should pay attention more closely to their communications.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We introduce a new approach preventing strong open wormhole attacks. The WIM-DSR protocol uses the information collected by the destination node during the route discovery process of a multipath routing protocol to detect suspicious behaviour. The results obtained in this paper show that the WIM-DSR protocol is able to detect all strong open wormhole attacks with a very low rate of false positive alarms. This solution does not require any cryptographic processing by the intermediate nodes, if no attack takes place. This represents an improvement on the solution presented by Wang et al. [1] .
In future works, we will focus on relaxing the assumptions on which WIM-DSR relies. Specially, we will investigate how to allow more malicious nodes.
